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Keeping Stigma Out of Administrative Law:
An Explanation of Consistent Beliefs
Roberto Galbiati* and Nuno Garoupa**
We provide an interpretation based on consistent beliefs for
the widely accepted observation that a criminal conviction
generates more stigma than an administrative penalty. Impli-
cations for the criminalization of administrative non-
compliance are discussed.
I. INTRODUCTION
It is widely accepted that a criminal conviction generates more stigma
for the convicted party than an administrative penaltyI In this paper
we provide an explanation of this observation based on consistent be-
liefs about the reliability of information concerning guilt transmitted
by a conviction under administrative and criminal regimes. In partic-
ular, we show that the higher stigma associated with criminal convic-
tions is justified on the grounds that a criminal conviction conveys
more reliable information about guilt than an administrative one. Al-
though a criminal conviction is less easily obtained due to a higher
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' Ashworth calls them non-severe sanctions, including regulatory proceedings, ad-
ministrative offences, or civil sanctions. See A. Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law
(Oxford, 2003).
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standard of proof and the need to consider a mental state, it is also
more reliable because a higher standard of proof guarantees that fewer
innocents are mistakenly convicted. Hence we argue that if the pro-
portion of mistaken convictions is lower in a criminal than in an ad-
ministrative regime, then it makes sense for society to extract more
information concerning guilt (and therefore how individual prefer-
ences look like) from a criminal conviction, and to pay less attention
to the application of administrative penalties. 2
Generally speaking, there are two kinds of legal sanctions, the kind
that are accompanied by stigma and the kind that are not. Many com-
mentators assume that the difference between the two is entirely due
to the substance of the prohibition, e.g., speeding (no stigma) versus
murder (stigma). Our point is that procedure (that is, the standard of
proof) makes an important contribution towards whether or not there
is stigma. An immediate consequence of this observation is that the
government has some control over whether its penalties cause stigma. 3
We do not pursue here the discussion on stigma as an efficient de-
terrent, 4 nor do we justify the optimal combination of criminal and
administrative law. Our point is simply to state that the fact that crim-
inal convictions are more stigmatizing than administrative penalties
is easily understood as the outcome of consistent beliefs concerning
guilt, and this rationale has important implications for legal policies.6
Our explanation has consequences for the debate over the reform
2 Our argument is independent of the moral neutrality of regulatory or administra-
tive offenses. Coffee and Green present opposing views. J. Coffee, Reflections on the
Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 Buffalo Univ L Rev 193
(1991). S.P. Green, Why It is a Crime to Tear the Tag Off a Mattress: Overcriminaliza-
tion and the Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46(4) Emory L J 1533-1615 (1997).
Green also points out the ambiguity given to white-collar wrongdoings. S.P. Green,
Moral Ambiguity in White Collar Criminal Law, 18 Notre Dame J L, Ethics, & Pub
Policy 501-519 (2004).
3 The economic theory of regulation has not addressed the problem because it has
not paid enough attention to institutional details, hence usually referring to sanctions
in a broad sense, not distinguishing regulatory or administrative penalties from crim-
inal sanctions; see J.J. Laffont and J. Tirole, A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and
Regulation (Cambridge, 1993). For an exception, see P. Fenn and C. Veljanovski, A Pos-
itive Economic Theory of Regulatory Enforcement, 98 Econ J 1055-77 (1988).
4 See E. Rasmusen, Stigma and Self-Filling Expectations of Criminality, 39 J L &
Econ 519-44 (1996); D.L. Wong, Stigma: A More Efficient Alternative to Fines in De-
terring Corporate Misconduct, 3 Cal Crim L Rev Article 3 (2000); K. Furuya, A Socio-
Economic Model of Stigma and Related Social Problems, 48 J Econ Beh & Org 281-90
(2002); P. Funk, On the Effective Use of Stigma as a Crime-Deterrent, 48(4) Eur Econ
Rev 715-25 (2004).
5 N. Garoupa E Gomez-Pomar, Punish Once or Punish Twice: A Theory of the Use
of Criminal Sanctions in Addition to Regulatory Penalties, 6(2) Amer L & Econ Rev
410-33 (2004).
6 Obviously, our results are reinforced by the fact that criminal proceedings are
more expensive than administrative proceedings.
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of administrative law in the sense that the suggestions offered by sev-
eral authors will affect the differences in the re-liability of convictions
in conveying valuable information. In particular we argue that changes
in the standard of proof;7 the replacement of the current so-called com-
pliance strategy pursued by regulatory agencies by a more sanctioning-
oriented strategy typical of prosecution; s the enforcement of identical
guidelines on police and prosecution services as well as on regulatory
agencies; 9 or the empowerment of criminal courts in the area of ad-
ministrative law10 will dilute beliefs. Our reasoning has further im-
portant implications about the publicity of convictions. Namely, as
the level of stigmatization depends on both the reliability of infor-
mation about guilt and from publicity, policies aiming at increasing
the level of publicity for administrative offences (e.g., tax evasion,
traffic accidents, corporate crimes) without appropriate changes in
the procedure would certainly raise stigma, but create some other im-
portant problems. In particular, such policies might weaken the reli-
ability of the information provided by convictions and might create
inefficient and unfair stigma.
The reduction of the differentials between beliefs is positive if one
takes the view that the stigma differential should not exist, but it will
be problematic if this stigma differential is part of efficient deter-
rence.I Our rationale also applies to the fact that the payment of dam-
ages in tort law does not create much stigma, but that has not gener-
ated the same criticism as administrative law.'2
7 For example, Ashworth points out that "when instances of significant wrongdo-
ing are moved from the criminal to the civil law in order to avoid the criminal protec-
tions, serious questions of propriety are raised." A. Ashworth, Principles of Criminal
Law (Oxford, 2003).
a For a theoretical approach, see P. Fenn and C. Veljanovski, A Positive Economic
Theory of Regulatory Enforcement, 98 Econ J 1055-77 (1988). For the argument that
such a trend is already observable in practice, see R. Baldwin, The New Punitive Reg-
ulation, 67 Mod L Rev 351-83 (2004).
9 In general, see A. Ashworth, The Criminal Process: an Evaluative Study (Oxford,
1988); in detail, see G. Richardson, Strict Liability for Regulatory Crime: The Empiri-
cal Research, 1987 Crim L Rev 295-99.
10 For example, where there are separate proceedings for administrative or regula-
tory offenses, the European Court of Human Rights requires it be open to defendants
to have the case heard in a criminal court if desired.
I ISee J.M. Karpoff and J.R. Lott, The Reputational Penalty Firms Bear from Com-
mitting Criminal Fraud, 36 J L & Econ 757-802 (1993) and N. Garoupa, 21 (6) Man-
agerial & Decision Econ 243 -252 (2000), on corporate criminal liability. Contrast with
Wong, 3 Cal Crim L Rev 3 (cited in note 4). On the efficient nature of shaming penal-
ties, see D. Kahan, What do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U Chi L Rev 591 (1996).
12 With the possible exception of the debate over punitive damages. See G. Heriot,
An Essay on the Civil-Criminal Distinction with Special Reference to Punitive Dam-
ages, 7 J Contemp L 43 (1996), K. Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground
Between Criminal and Civil Law, 101 Yale L J 1795 (1992), and A.M. Polinsky and
S. Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 11 Harv L Rev 869-962 (1998).
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Finally, a general implication for the normative theory of law en-
forcement can be singled out from our reasoning. The mathematical
condition we derive to impose consistency between criminal and
administrative convictions and beliefs shows that maximal fines
are hardly appropriate. The rationale is that maximal criminal fines
would increase deterrence by far and hence the proportion of legal
mistakes would also increase (since we would have more innocents
and fewer guilty in relative terms). This result contrasts with previ-
ous literature. 13
This paper is structured as follows: in section two, we introduce
the model; in section three, we discuss the implications for adminis-
trative law; and concluding remarks are presented in section four.
II. The Model
A. Basic Setup
We use the basic framework of Polinsky and Shavell to study under
which conditions criminal law is a more reliable instrument than
administrative law in order to issue information concerning guilt and
hence produce stigma. 14 The following standard notation is used: b is
the illegal gain from committing an offense (private information); f is
the legal sanction (monetary/non-monetary); s is the cost of stigma
(in general, an extralegal sanction); p is the apprehension and convic-
tion probability for the guilty; and q is the apprehension and convic-
tion probability for the innocent. Consequently, innocents are wrongly
convicted with probability and criminals are wrongly acquitted with
probability 1 - p.
A potential wrongdoer will commit an unlawful act if b - p(f + s)
_ -q(f + s) or analogously, if b > (p - q)(f + s). The population is nor-
malized to one and the illegal gain is distributed across the popula-
tion according to a probability density function g(b) and a cumulative
density function G(b) with support in the interval [0,oo). The number
of criminals is given by 1 - G((p - q)(f + s)) and the number of honest
individuals is G((p - q)(f + s)).
The reliability of conviction in conveying information about guilt
is given by the following expression (total number of convicted guilty
divided by total number of convictions as in Bayesian inference):
VL (p, q, f + s) = p(l - G((p - q)(f + s)))
p(1 - G((p - q)(f + s))) + qG((p - q)(f + s))
13 A.M. Polinsky and S. Shavell, The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of
Law, 38 J Econ Lit 45-76 (2000).
14 Id.
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Figure 1.
The reliability of conviction expressed by (1) can be rearranged as:
p(p,q,f + s) = 1
I + X(p,q,f + s)
Xp, q, f + s)= qG((p - q)(f + s)) (2)
p(l - G((p - q)(f + s)))
Notice that the reliability of conviction is strictly decreasing in
the extralegal sanction s (due to the fact that it increases deterrence,
and therefore the number of wrongly convicted individuals increases
in relation to the number of correctly convicted criminals).
In this setup, the extralegal sanction (stigma) is determined by the
reliability of conviction and the publicity it gets from the government
in the following way:
s = Op(p,qf + s)= 0(3)
1 + X(p, q,f + s) (3)
where 0 can be seen as the probability that individuals will be aware
of convictions. Figure 1 illustrates the stigma obtained by a convic-
tion given all other parameters of the model.
B. Criminal Versus Administrative Law
Let us now consider criminal and administrative offenses. The sub-
script C designates criminal law and A designates administrative law.
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From here on, we denote by simplicity G((pi - qi)((fi - si)) = Gi. We rely
upon the following assumptions:
(i) fc> fA;
(ii) qc > q,;(iii) PC > P';
(iv) PC > qc;
(v) pA > qA;
(vi) q. / PA = q,, / PC;
(vii) 0c > 0A*
Assumption (i) is consistent with the observation that a conviction
in criminal law is more severe than in administrative law. Assump-
tions (ii) and (iii) imply that convictions are easier to both the inno-
cent and the guilty in administrative law due to the lower standard of
proof'5 . Assumptions (iv) and (v) state that the probability of convict-
ing the guilty is higher than that for the innocent for both criminal
sanctions and administrative penalties. Assumption (vi) indicates that
the probability of a wrong conviction is the same under both regimes
for a given probability of a correct conviction. That is, if the probabil-
ity of conviction of an offender were the same under both regimes then
so it would the probability of conviction of an innocent (hence the
lower standard of proof in administrative law hurts offenders and in-
nocents in the same way). Finally, assumption (vii) captures the idea
that criminal convictions get more publicity than administrative ones.
The observation that criminal law is associated with more stigma
than administrative law, s c > SA implies that:
0> OA(4)
1 + XC(p,q,f + s) 1 + \A(p,q,f + S)
Higher stigma for criminal convictions can be explained by two
facts. The first reason has to do with more publicity of convictions.
The second explanation relates to the information concerning guilt
transmitted by a conviction 16. Conviction under a regime of criminal
law transmits information about guilt more reliably than in a regime
of administrative law if ,c > XA, that is if:
'5 It is worth noting that not only different standard of proofs but also a mens rea
requirement makes it much more difficult to observe a criminal conviction than an ad-
ministrative one. Indeed a mental state such as intent, knowledge, or recklessness is
usually required for a criminal conviction. By contrast, administrative laws are usually
enforced on the basis of strict liability and consequently are much easier. We thank an
anonymous referee for having suggested us this point.
16 There might be an intrinsic relationship between publicity and information con-
cerning guilt. It seems plausible that the greater publicity for criminal convictions
could arise because of the greater reliability of the underlying information. Neverthe-
less that is affected by the way authorities deal with criminal convictions and depends
on the structure of the market for publicity which we do not discuss here.
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< qG, (5)
p,(1 - Gj pA(l - GA)
Given our assumption (vi), the above condition is reduced to G c >
GA. A conviction under a regime of criminal law is more reliable if
and only if criminal law is less effective as a deterrent' 7. From (5), the
reason is quite intuitive: criminal law is more reliable because the
proportion of innocents (hence of convicted innocents) is lower and
the proportion of criminals (hence of convicted criminals) is higher
than under administrative law.
A conviction under criminal law is a more reliable means for con-
veying information about guilt when:
(P, - qc)(f, + SC) < (PA - qA)(fA + SA) (6)
The necessary condition to satisfy (6) is that (Pc - qj is much lower
than (PA - qA) which is consistent with our assumptions. 8
Remark 1: Given the higher standard of proof of criminal law, a crim-
inal conviction conveys information about guilt more reliably (and
consistently implies higher stigma) whenever (f, + Sc) > (fA + SA) > (PI
- qC)/(PA 
- qA)(fC + SJ)"
The remark above has some normative implications for limiting
the magnitude of criminal sanctions in contrast with the usual law
enforcement literature. 19 For a given probability of convicting the
guilty and error of convicting the innocent, the overall criminal (legal
and extralegal) sanction should not exceed the administrative (legal
and extralegal) penalty for more than a certain amount. In particular
when the stigma associated with criminal sanctions is particularly
higher than that associated with administrative penalties; the legal
criminal sanction (e.g. a fine) could be close to the legal administra-
tive penalty.20 Certainly, maximal fines are hardly consistent with
our setup.
17 Notice that in our framework the prosecutor behaviour is considered as exoge-
nous. This implies that there is no reaction of the prosecutor to the lower reliability of
convictions occurring when maximal sanctions deter almost all potential criminals,
for example, there is no increase in the burden of proof needed to prosecute as a reac-
tion to higher sanctions. Hence, whatever is the reliability of convictions the proba-
bilities of conviction are given.
"Indeed notice that pc(1 - qc/p) < pA( 1 - qA/pA) is equivalent to p, < PA by as-
sumption (vi).
'9 Namely, the Beckerian maximal fine. See G.S. Becker, Crime and Punishment:
An Economic Approach, 76 J Pol Econ 169-217 (1968); Polinsky and Shavell, 11 Harv
L Rev at 869-962 (cited in note 12).
20 There is some economic literature on discounting extra-legal sanctions, see
R. Cooter and A. Porat, Should Courts Deduct Nonlegal Sanctions from Damages? 30
J Legal Stud 401-22 (2001).
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Figures two and three present the two possible cases where s. > SA
and consistent with our explanations, figure 2 refers to a situation
where criminal law provides more reliable information concerning
guilt (condition (6) is satisfied), whereas figure 3 shows the situation
where although criminal law does not provide more reliable informa-
s/0, 1/(I +X) Administrative law
Criminal law
s
sa Sc
Figure 2.
s/0,1/(I +X) Administrative law
Criminal law
s
sa SC
Figure 3.
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tion (condition (6) is not satisfied) the fact that it gets more publicity
produces the result in terms of stigma.
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR REFORM OF
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Our model suggests that a criminal conviction conveys information
about guilt in a more reliable way than an administrative conviction.
Therefore, more stigma for criminal sanctions is justified than for
administrative penalties. The growth of regulatory offences and the
range of administrative law in modern societies have raised several
objections by legal commentators. Several authors have called for the
reform of administrative law in the sense of criminalizing regulatory
offences, or at least reduce the striking differences between criminal
and administrative convictions.
One possibility is to ask regulatory agencies to provide publicity of
convictions inasmuch as criminal convictions get more attention.
The objective of this measure would be to increase stigma for corpo-
rations, tax evaders or individuals who cause traffic accidents. In
terms of our model, let the government increase the publicity for ad-
ministrative convictions from 0 A to 0.. The consequences of this pol-
icy will depend on which situation we are in terms of figures two and
three. Figures 4 and 5 provide a graphical analysis of the following
remarks:
Remark 2: Suppose GC < GA. When the government increases 0 from
0A to 0C, the stigma generated by a conviction under administrative
law increases but does not achieve sc. At the same time, the degree of
reliability of the information provided by an administrative convic-
tion decreases.
Remark 3: Suppose GA < Gc. When the government increases 0 from
0 A to 0c, the stigma generated by a conviction under administrative
law increases and is above sc . At the same time, the degree of relia-
bility of the information provided by an administrative conviction
decreases.
The provision of criminal publicity for convictions by regulatory
agencies would certainly raise stigma, but creating an important prob-
lem in our view. It weakens the reliability of the information provided
by such conviction (an apparently strange result given that stigma in-
creases, but not so if we take into consideration that such increase is
due to the publicity). Also, we should not disregard the fact that given
the higher likelihood of mistaken convictions for the innocents, this
policy might create inefficient and unfair stigma.
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Fortner
s/0,1/( +X) Admini
New
sa sc
Figure 4.
...
sa sc
Figure 5.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
strative law
Administrative Law
Former
Administrative law
Criminal law
This paper provides an alternative explanation to the observation that
criminal convictions are more stigmatized than administrative ones.
The literature has often emphasized that stigmatization depends on
the gravity of the act causing the conviction. We suggest that an al-
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ternative explanation may rest in the reliability of information about
guilt, and so about preferences, of those convicted.2'
We derive several theoretical implications. In particular we show
that a criminal conviction conveys information about guilt in a more
reliable way than an administrative conviction. Therefore, more stigma
attached to criminal sanctions than to administrative penalties is jus-
tified. We also derive a normative implication for the theory of opti-
mal law enforcement. Indeed we show that imposing maximal sanc-
tions in criminal proceedings is not consistent with reliability in
conveying information because it would generate too many incorrect
criminal convictions (since a much large proportion of potential
criminals would be deterred) and therefore reduce the ability to ex-
tract information concerning guilt from a criminal record. On the
policy ground our reasoning has some implications for the debate
about the reduction in differences between criminal and administra-
tive convictions that have been called for by several authors. We show
that higher publicity in the administrative law may be inconsistent
with beliefs and lead to inefficient or unfair stigma. Proposals have
been made in the direction of avoiding decriminalization of regula-
tory offences, including the discretionary power of regulatory agen-
cies when compared to the police or prosecution services. In order to
reduce these differences, the enforcement of identical guidelines and
accountability rules on police and prosecution services as well as on
regulatory agencies has been proposed. All these measures will re-
duce the discrepancies between administrative and criminal pro-
ceedings, which naturally will reduce the signalling characterization
of criminal convictions.
21 Our argument relies on different standards of proof and probability of convicting
the innocents (and acquitting the guilty) of administrative and criminal law. A related
argument relies on mens rea. Indeed, stigmatization may depend on the mental state of
the wrongdoer (namely the intent of the wrongdoer to harm) as the explicit intent to
harm would be a stronger signal of individual preferences than the mere causation of
the harm. In this case, strict administrative liability is a very weak signal of the wrong-
doer's intent to harm (and so of his/her preferences), whereas a criminal conviction re-
quiring for mens rea is a stronger signal of the individual's preferences. The legal pol-
icy implications of such an argument would be very similar to those of our reasoning.

